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APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 890376 
Appellants Shire Development ("Shire") and Albert 
Charboneau ("Charboneau") will respond herein to the arguments 
raised by Respondents (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Frontier") in their Brief. 
OBJECTIONS TO FRONTIER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Shire and Charboneau object to the following statements 
contained in Frontier's Statement of Facts. The paragraph 
numbers correspond to the paragraph numbers contained in 
Frontier's Brief. 
3, Ignoring the substantial evidence to the contrary, 
Frontier asserts that it "intended to and has looked solely to 
Glezos for performance" under the November 1, 1984 real estate 
contract (the "Contract"). To the contrary, the undisputed 
evidence shows that $80,725.11 of the payments made to 
Frontier on the contract were paid directly to Frontier by 
Shire and Charboneau. Glezos only paid the first $11,000.00. 
Frontier actually picked up one payment from Shire at Shire's 
offices in Salt Lake City. Further, Frontier requested that 
Shire and Charboneau agree to a proposed settlement of the 
federal court action in which Glezos sought recovery of the 
amounts paid under the Contract. It was only after Shire and 
Charboneau would not agree to the settlement that Frontier 
secretly entered into an agreement to settle Glezos1 claim for 
the $11,000.00 he paid on the Contract. [R. 135-137, 145, 152] 
6. Frontier asserts that it "had no knowledge of the 
oral agreement entered into between Glezos and Shire and 
Charboneau . . .". Clearly, there is an issue of fact in this 
regard. As previously demonstrated, Frontier accepted 
payments directly from Shire and Charboneau on the Contract in 
the amount of $80,725.11 and even picked up one of the 
payments from Shire at Shire's offices. From these facts 
alone, a jury could certainly conclude that Frontier knew of 
the interest of Shire and Charboneau in the Contract. Why 
else would Shire and Charboneau make the payments? Further, 
Frontier demonstrated its knowledge of the interest of Shire 
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and Charboneau in the Contract and to the return of the monies 
paid when during the federal court action Frontier asked Shire 
and Charboneau to agree to a settlement. 
12. Frontier states that in September 1987, "Frontier 
and Glezos settled the dispute that was the basis of the 
United States District Court action . . .". However, that 
agreement in fact only settled Glezos1 claim to the $11,000.00 
he had paid under the Contract. Frontier and Glezos 
specifically acknowledged they were not settling any claim 
that Shire and Charboneau had to the remaining $80,725.11 paid 
on the Contract because Shire and Charboneau would not agree 
to a settlement. [R. 73, 136-137, 156] 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The District Court Erred in Ruling That Shire and 
Charboneau Had Received No Interest in the Contract. 
Frontier erroneously argues that Shire and Charboneau 
have no standing to maintain this action because they cannot 
point the Court to a document signed by Glezos expressly 
stating that he assigned any rights in the Contract to Shire 
and Charboneau. Frontier's contention is simply wrong and 
ignores the uncontroverted evidence in this case. 
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Frontier does not dispute that its Contract with Glezos 
allowed Glezos to assign rights in the Contract without any 
consent from Frontier. Nor does Frontier dispute that Glezos 
actually entered into an oral joint venture agreement with 
Shire and Charboneau for the purchase of the property, nor 
that Shire and Charboneau paid the vast majority of the 
purchase price directly to Frontier. What Frontier refuses to 
face up to is that the legal effect of the joint venture 
agreement was to give Shire and Charboneau an interest in the 
Contract as demonstrated by the authorities cited in 
Appellants' initial Brief. [Pgs. 10-13] 
The cases cited by Frontier in support of its standing 
argument are not on point. 
For example, Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc. 
v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977), did not involve an 
assignment or a joint venture. The plaintiff there sought 
recovery from the property owner of sums for materials and 
services provided to the lessee of the property without the 
knowledge or consent of the owner. The court simply held that 
having not pursued its lien rights, the plaintiff could not 
recover from the owner. The case has nothing to do with the 
issues involved in the present case. 
In Wvatt v. Bowers, 747 P.2d 881 (Nev. 1987), cited by 
Frontier, the court only held that an indemnitee lacked 
standing to recover against an investor for breach of the 
investor's promise to the indemnitor to sign whatever 
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documents were necessary to personally guaranty a 
corporation's lease obligation. 
Olson v. Iacometti, 533 P.2d 1360 (Nev. 1975), is 
similarly not on point. There, the court simply held that an 
agreement between the holder of a note secured by a Deed of 
Trust and the holder of a second note and Deed of Trust on the 
same property did not entitle the debtor to a discharge of his 
liability on the second note. 
Finally, in Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102 
(Utah Ct.App. 1988), relied upon by Frontier, the plaintiffs 
sold property on a Uniform Real Estate Contract to the 
original purchaser. The original purchaser in turn resold the 
property on a second Uniform Real Estate Contract. The 
original seller foreclosed and attempted to hold the 
subsequent purchasers liable even though they were not parties 
to the plaintiffs' sales contract. The case was not decided 
on summary judgment, but only after a trial before the court. 
The court concluded based upon the evidence at trial that the 
subsequent purchasers had not assumed any liability under the 
first contract. 
2. The Joint Venture Agreement is Not Barred by the 
Statute of Frauds. 
The district court properly rejected Frontier's argument 
that the joint venture agreement was required to be in writing 
5 
in order to transfer any rights in the Contract to Shire and 
Charboneau. [R. 16] 
Initially, even if the joint venture agreement were 
required to be in writing, Frontier could not object because 
it was not a party to the joint venture agreement. For 
example, in Family Finance Fund v. Abraham, 657 P.2d 1319 
(Utah 1982), the court held that a prospective buyer of real 
property could not assert the statute of frauds to prevent the 
enforcement of an oral contract between the sellers and 
purchasers of the property. See, also, Harmon v. Tanner Motor 
Tours, 377 P.2d 622 (Nev. 1963). 
Second, the Contract for the sale of the property 
between Glezos and Frontier was in fact in writing as it was 
required to be. Glezos only orally transferred part of his 
interest in the Contract to Shire and Charboneau. Glezos has 
never denied that transfer, the undisputed evidence 
demonstrates that it was made and the transfer not required to 
be in writing. For example, in Ellingson v. Sloan, 527 P.2d 
1100 (Ariz.App. 1975), the court quoted from Eads v. Murphy, 
232 P. 877-879 (Ariz. 1925), as follows: 
" While there is some conflict of authority, 
yet the overwhelming weight is to the effect that 
a parol partnership agreement or joint enterprise 
entered into by two or more persons, for the 
purpose of purchasing and selling real estate or 
interests therein for speculation, the profits to 
be divided among the parties, is not within the 
statute of frauds relating to the sale of lands or 
an interest therein, and that such an agreement 
may become effectual and suit maintained thereon, 
though not in writing." [527 P.2d at 1105] 
6 
The third reason the statute of frauds does not apply in 
this case is that this is not an action to enforce an oral 
conveyance of real property. Rather, it is simply an 
equitable action to recover money admittedly paid by Shire and 
Charboneau to Frontier for the purchase of property under a 
Contract which everybody admits existed. The statute of 
frauds simply does not apply in such a situation. See, e.g., 
Jensen v. Whitesides, 370 P.2d 765 (Utah 1962); Davis 
v.Preston, 102 S.2d 788 (La. 1958); Woodruff v. Camp, 112 
S.E.2d 831 (Ga. 1960). For example, in Woodruff, the court 
held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover money paid 
under an unenforceable oral argument to purchase land, 
observing: 
An action for the purpose of recovering money 
paid on such an oral executory contract is an 
action for money had and received, and is in no 
sense an action either to enforce a contract for 
the sale of land or for damages for breach of 
contract and is not within the statute of frauds. 
It is, therefore, immaterial that the contract or 
writing sued upon would be legally insufficient to 
authorize its enforcement in terms or to authorize 
the recovery of damages for its breach. [112 
S.E.2d at 832] 
Fourth, even if the statute of frauds otherwise applied, 
the payments admittedly paid to Frontier by Shire and 
Charboneau constitute part performance of the Contract which 
would take the case out of the statute of frauds. See, In re 
Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d 278 (Utah 1954). 
Finally, even if the statute of frauds were applicable, 
a written agreement does indeed exist acknowledging the joint 
7 
venture agreement between Glezos, Shire and Charboneau. That 
is the agreement dated September 25, 1986 which the joint 
venturers entered into at the time the federal action was 
pending between Glezos and Frontier. In that agreement, 
Glezos specifically acknowledged that Shire and Charboneau had 
contributed money for the purchase of the property, that they 
were entitled to share in any judgment or settlement obtained 
from Frontier in Glezos1 action to recover all sums paid under 
the Contract in the same percentage as their contributions 
toward the purchase of the property, and that the case could 
not be settled without the consent of a majority of the joint 
venturers. 
Frontier downplays the significance of this agreement, 
arguing that "the Proceeds Sharing Agreement does not purport 
to assign Glezos' interest in the property to Shire and 
Charboneau." [Frontier Brief, pg. 9] Frontier misses the 
import of that agreement. Shire and Charboneau do not contend 
that that agreement constituted an assignment of Glezos' 
interest in the Contract; that had been accomplished years 
earlier at the time the property was purchased and the 
purchase price paid to Frontier by Shire and Charboneau. 
Rather, the agreement constituted a written acknowledgment by 
Glezos of the joint venture and the interest of Shire and 
Charboneau in the Contract. The only interest which remained 
at the time this agreement was signed in September of 1986 was 
the right to recover the purchase price paid for the property 
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on the ground that to allow Frontier to keep the money would 
constitute an unenforceable penalty. 
Frontier relies upon Goats v. Bayless Markets, Inc., 481 
P.2d 536 (Ariz.App. 1971) for its statute of frauds argument. 
That case is distinguishable. The court in Goats observed 
that the oral assignment of the lease was not binding upon the 
lessor "without its knowledge and consent". [481 P.2d at 540] 
Unlike Goatsf this is not an action to enforce a disputed oral 
lease, but to recover money admittedly paid by Shire and 
Charboneau to Frontier on a Contract everyone agrees 
existed. Further, the Contract between Frontier and Glezos in 
the present case allowed Glezos to assign his interest without 
the consent of Frontier. In addition, there is at the least a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether Frontier knew about Shire 
and Charboneau's interest in the Contract and by accepting 
payments consented to that interest. 
Frontier purports to distinguish the joint venture cases 
cited by Shire and Charboneau on the basis that all those 
cases supposedly stand for is the proposition that if all an 
agreement does is "merely govern the relationship and 
obligations as between the purchasing joint venturers 
themselves" and does not "purport to transfer an interest in 
real property", that the agreement does not have to be in 
writing but that "such agreements do not give a joint venturer 
rights against a seller who contracted only with another joint 
venturer." [Frontier Brief, pgs. 12-13] Frontier cites no 
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authorities for this proposition which unduly restricts the 
principles set forth in the authorities cited in Appellants1 
initial Brief. Those authorities demonstrate that a joint 
venture agreement for the purchase of property is not required 
to be in writing and that once Glezos entered into his joint 
venture with Shire and Charboneau, his interest in the 
Contract was held in trust for his co-venturers regardless of 
any express language of assignment. Glezos was fully entitled 
under his contract with Frontier to transfer all of his 
interest without any consent from Frontier. Frontier accepted 
most of the payments on the Contract directly from Shire and 
Charboneau and well knew they had an interest in the Contract. 
Consequently, Frontier can hardly be heard to complain that 
Glezos transferred part of his interest to Shire and 
Charboneau or that such transfer was not in writing. 
Finally, Frontier asserts that Glezos did not intend the 
oral joint venture agreement to be an assignment because in 
the Release of Claims executed by Glezos in the settlement of 
the federal action in 1987, Glezos1 counsel reserved the right 
to assign Glezos' rights to Shire and Charboneau. Again, this 
argument is without merit. There was no evidence in the court 
below of exactly what Glezos1 counsel intended by inserting 
that reservation into his agreement with Frontier. Glezos1 
intent in this regard is a question of fact. More 
importantly, if Glezos had already transferred an interest in 
the Contract to Shire and Charboneau by entering into the 
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joint venture, nothing which he unilaterally did in a later 
agreement with Frontier could affect that transfer. The 
evidence was uncontroverted that Glezos entered into an oral 
joint venture agreement with Shire and Charboneau in 1984 for 
the purchase of the property from Frontier. The legal effect 
of the joint venture was to give Shire and Charboneau an 
interest in the Contract. 
CONCLUSION 
Frontier is asking this Court in this equitable action 
to adopt a hypertechnical view of the law in order to preclude 
Shire and Charboneau from recovering the money which they paid 
directly to Frontier on the Contract. Yet Frontier and Glezos 
have already acknowledged that any right to recover this money 
belongs to Shire and Charboneau. Hence, if Shire and 
Charboneau do not have standing to recover this money, then no 
one does. It would turn logic on its head to rule that 
although Shire and Charboneau were joint venturers with Glezos 
for purchase of the property and that Glezos has no right to 
recover money which he did not pay, nevertheless Shire and 
Charboneau have no standing to recover the money which 
Frontier knowingly received directly from them. If in fact 
the evidence at trial shows that it would be an unconscionable 
penalty to allow Frontier to keep the money, Frontier should 
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be required to pay that 
was paid. 
money back to those by whom the 
money 
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